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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN THE 
ERA OF OIRA 
Lisa Heinzerling* 
In recent years, the Office of Information and Regulatory Af-
fairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) has asserted a remarkable degree of authority over admin-
istrative agencies' rulemaking processes. One of the ways in which 
OIRA has exercised power over agencies has been to foist upon 
them its own views about the requirements of the statutes under 
which they operate. The most notable trend in this area has been 
OIRA's insistence on converting technology-based environmental 
laws into cost-benefit laws. In OIRA's hands, for example, the 
Clean Water Act! ("the Act") is being transformed from a technol-
ogy-based regime into a cost-benefit regime. 
I will argue that this transformation is illegal. Given the plain 
language of the statute, it would be illegal even if the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA)-the agency charged with imp le-
. menting the Act-had chosen this course. But EPA did not choose 
this course; OIRA did. OIRA's role in transforming EPA's under-
standing of the Act robs EPA's interpretation of any deference it 
might have been given under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. 2 if EPA itself had chosen the 
interpretation. 
I use the Clean Water Act, and in particular a rule governing 
cooling water towers for power plants, as my case study. But the 
analysis applies whenever OIRA foists upon an administrative 
agency an interpretation of a statute that the agency has Congres-
sional authority to administer. When OIRA's interpretation, not 
the agency's, prevails, the agency's reluctant embrace of OIRA's 
views does not deserve the deference Chevron might otherwise 
afford. 
Part I of this Article provides background on 0 IRA, the Clean 
Water Act, and EPA's rulemaking on cooling water towers. Part II 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This Article draws 
upon an amicus brief I wrote (on a pro bono basis) for OMB Watch in the case chal-
lenging the Clean Water Act rule discussed in detail here. I am grateful to Robert 
Rosing and David Tarr for their excellent research assistance. 
1. 33 U.S.c.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2006). 
2. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
1097 
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discusses why EPA's interpretation of the Clean Water Act in the 
proceeding on cooling water towers was in error and why, given 
OIRA's deep involvement, EPA's interpretation does not deserve 
Chevron deference. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
OIRA is situated within the OMB. Created by the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1980,3 OIRA has the authority to monitor and 
reduce the paperwork burden of the federal government and pri-
vate entities.4 OIRA also oversees the Unfunded Mandate Re-
form Act, which creates special procedural rules for Congress's 
consideration of legislation having certain specified effects on obli-
gations of states and local governments;5 the Information Quality 
Act, which aims at ensuring the reliability of information dissemi-
nated by the federal agencies;6 and the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act, which requires agencies to consider the 
effects of their actions on the nation's small businesses.7 Under the 
Regulatory Right-to-Know Act, OIRA is also required to publish 
an annual report on the costs and benefits of federal regulation.s 
Yet, in terms of influence, none of OIRA's statutory obligations 
has surpassed the authority given to it under two different Execu-
tive Orders. The first, Executive Order 12,291,9 which was issued 
by President Reagan in 1981, required OIRA to oversee compli-
ance with the Executive Order's new requirement that agency reg-
ulations costing $100 million or more be subject to a cost-benefit 
analysis.10 The second, President Clinton's Executive Order 
12,866, superseded Executive Order 12,291 in 1993.11 Executive 
Order 12,866 is similar in many respects to the Order it displaced; 
it, too, requires cost-benefit analysis for major agency regulations 
and gives OIRA oversight authority regarding agencies' cost-bene-
3. 44 V.S.CA. § 3503 (West 2006). Section 3503 establishes OIRA. Id. 
4. § 3504 (enumerating the Director of OIRA's responsibilities). 
5. 2 V.S.CA. § 1501 (West 2006). 
6. Information Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000). 
7. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-121, § 201, 110 Stat. 847 (codified at 5 V.S.C §§ 801-808). 
8. Regulatory Right-to-Know Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 624, 114 Stat. 
2763. 
9. Exec. Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981). 
10. [d. 
11. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
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fit analysesY Moreover, Executive Order 12,866, like Executive 
Order 12,291, specifically states that it does not displace any statu-
tory requirements the agencies otherwise face.13 
In its memorandum concluding that Executive Order 12,291 did 
not unconstitutionally interfere with other agencies' prerogatives, 
the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel emphasized 
that the Executive Order did not undo agencies' obligations under 
existing law, including congressional enactments: 
[I]t is clear that the President's exercise of supervisory powers 
must conform to legislation enacted by Congress. In issuing di-
rectives to govern the Executive Branch, the President may not, 
as a general proposition, require or permit agencies to trans-
gress boundaries set by Congress. . . . 
. . . This Office has often taken the position that the President 
may consult with those having statutory decision-making re-
sponsibilities, and may require them to consider statutorily rele-
vant matters that he deems appropriate, as long as the President 
does not divest the officer of ultimate statutory authority .... 
. . . The Order [E.O. 12,291] does not empower the Director [of 
OMB] ... to displace the relevant agencies in discharging their 
statutory functions or in assessing and weighing the costs and 
benefits of proposed actions. . .. [The Director's] power of con-
sultation would not ... include authority to reject an agency's 
ultimate judgment, delegated to it by law, that potential benefits 
outweigh costs, that priorities under the statute compel a partic-
ular course of action, or that adequate information is available 
to justify regulation .... 14 
Likewise, OIRA's first Administrator, James C. Miller III, testi-
fied before Congress that: 
President Reagan's Executive order imposes requirements on 
the agencies only "to the extent permitted by law" and only to 
the extent that its terms would not "conflict with deadlines im-
posed by statute or by judicial order." The limited application 
of [Executive Order 12,291] is a crucial point, one that insures 
[its] legality and the legality of actions pursuant to [itV5 
12. Id. at 51,737; Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. at 13,193. 
13. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,735; Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 
Fed. Reg. at 13,198. 
14. Role of OMB in Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Congo 154-58 (1981) 
(memorandum of David Stockman, Director, Office of Management and Budget). 
15. Role of OMB in Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Congo 46 (1981) 
(statement of James C. Miller III, Administrator, Office of Management and Budget). 
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From the beginning, therefore, it has been clear that, in review-
ing the regulatory initiatives of its sister agencies, OIRA may not 
interfere with the agencies' compliance with statutory directives. 
In the past several years, OIRA has become increasingly in-
volved in agency rulemaking proceedings. In September 2001, 
John Graham, OIRA's Administrator, sent a memorandum to the 
heads of all federal agencies, signaling his intent to use OIRA's 
oversight authority under Executive Order 12,866 in a variety of 
new ways.16 Graham noted that he would disapprove regulations 
that did not jibe with the cost-benefit framework of Executive Or-
der 12,866.17 OIRA has made good on this promise. In a 2003 
report, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded 
that OIRA "can have a significant-if not determinative-effect 
on a broad array of federal regulations .... " 18 According to GAO, 
between June 2001 and July 2002, "the primary effect of OIRA's 
suggestions was to delay or eliminate certain regulatory provisions 
that were included in the draft rules as submitted to OIRA" for six 
of the fourteen EPA rules specifically changed.19 Moreover, GAO 
found that twenty-four of the twenty-five rules it examined in its 
report were weakened during the OIRA review process.z° The 
unidirectional nature of OIRA's role in regulatory affairs led one 
scholar to call cost-benefit analysis in OIRA's hands a "one-way 
ratchet, able to stand still to be sure, but only capable of moving in 
one direction when it does function as a tool having some substan-
tive effect, that of making regulation less stringent. "21 Indeed, 
when agencies have offered proposals that involve deregulation 
rather than increased regulation, OIRA has not required a cost-
benefit analysis.22 
16. Memorandum from John D. Graham, Administrator, Office of Info. & Reg. 
Affairs (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforegloira_re-
view-process.html. 
17. Id. ("[T]he Administrator may decide to send a letter to the agency that re-
turns the rule for reconsideration. "). 
18. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RULEMAKING: OMB's ROLE IN REVIEWS OF 
AGENCIES' DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 3 (2003), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03929.pdf. 
19. Id. at 76. 
20. David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 
(forthcoming 2006). 
21. Id. 
22. Lisa Heinzerling & Rena I. Steinzor, A Perfect Storm: Mercury and the Bush 
Administration, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,485, 10,488 (2004) ("Thus, when the Bush Ad-
ministration relaxed requirements for power plants and other facilities under the new 
source review (NSR) program, it declined to conduct an economic analysis of the 
consequences of its actions."). 
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B. Technology-Based Regulation and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The Clean Water Act,23 passed in 1972 and amended in 1977, is 
the leading U.S. law protecting the nation's surface waters from 
pollution and other threats to their physical, biological, and chemi-
cal integrity. Several other federal statutes preceded the Clean 
Water Act; those statutes, in the words of the Senate Committee 
on Public Works, were "inadequate in every vital aspect. "24 The 
Clean Water Act departed from previous legislation in several im-
portant ways. For present purposes, the most important innovation 
was the transition from water-quality based standards to technol-
ogy-based standards for controlling water pollution.25 
The Clean Water Act relies on technology-based regulation as 
the strategy of first resort for cleaning up the nation's waters. 
Technology-based regulation is regulation that attempts to protect 
the environment through the use of some version of the best avail-
able technology for controlling pollution.26 The main advantage of 
technology-based regulation, compared to water-quality based reg-
ulation, is that one need not resolve all of the contentious scientific 
issues surrounding exactly what levels of pollution are bad for the 
waters before one proceeds to regulate.27 To be sure, depending 
on the specific formulation of the "best available technology" re-
quirement in place, the level of pollution reduction can be relevant 
to the technology-based inquiry. But under the Clean Water Act, 
the inquiry into the effluent reduction level achieved by various 
technologies has historically been very limited. In Weyerhaeuser 
Co. v. Costle,28 for example, the D.C. Circuit held that the consid-
eration of "effluent reduction benefits" called for by the Clean 
Water Act29 did not require EPA to conduct a fine-grained cost-
benefit analysis of technology requirements before imposing such 
requirements on the relevant industry.3o 
Ever since Congress passed the Clean Water Act, industry 
groups regulated by the Act have tried to convert the Act's tech-
nology-based standards into cost-benefit standards. Early on, the 
23. 33 V.S.c.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 2006). 
24. S. REP. No. 92-414, at 7 (1971), as reprinted in S. COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 
93RD CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT 
AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1425 (Comm. Print 1973). 
25. See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 184 (2d Cir. 2004). 
26. See, e.g., id. at 185 (citing to section 306 of the Clean Water Act). 
27. [d. at 184. 
28. 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
29. 33 U.S.c.A. § 1314(b) (West 2006). 
30. Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1048. 
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Weyerhaeuser litigation sought to require cost-benefit analysis in 
setting technology-based standards for the pulp and paper indus-
tryY Other cases involved-and rejected-similar arguments.32 
In the mid-1990s, Congress flirted with statutory amendments that 
would have required cost-benefit analysis of any rule costing more 
than $25 million; the amendments did not pass.33 At about the 
same time, Congress also considered legislation implementing 
Newt Gingrich's "Contract with America," which would have re-
quired cost-benefit analysis for major health, safety, and environ-
mental rules.34 This legislation, too, failed to pass. 
Thus, from the earliest days of the Clean Water Act, EPA, the 
courts, and Congress have agreed that the Act's technology-based 
requirements are not to be based on cost-benefit analysis. Efforts 
to import cost-benefit analysis into the Act's basic structure have 
failed. Yet, some of the Act's technology-based provisions require 
consideration of both the economic costs and the "effluent reduc-
tion benefits" of regulations.35 What is the difference between 
these two regulatory approaches? 
Cost-benefit analysis is different from technology-based regula-
tion in three principal ways. First, cost-benefit analysis is indiffer-
ent to whether, at the end of the day, any regulation whatsoever is 
imposed on the actors subject to the relevant law. If the costs of 
regulation are too high in relation to the benefits, then the cost-
benefit analyst will recommend rejecting the regulation.36 Technol-
ogy-based regulation, on the other hand, takes it as a given that 
entities subject to the law will be subject to some form of pollution 
control requirements when all is said and done; the only question is 
how stringent those requirements will be?7 Cost-benefit analysis is 
31. [d. at 1036. 
32. See, e.g., Tex. Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 161 F.3d 923, 936 n.9 (5th Cir. 1998); 
B.P. Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. EPA, 66 F.3d 784, 799-800 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing CPC 
Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329, 1341-42 (8th Cir. 1976)). 
33. H.R. 961, 104th Congo § 324(a)(1)(B) (as referred in the Senate, May 19, 1995, 
version 4). The bill died in committee. 
34. H.R. 9, 104th Congo §§ 401-61 (as referred in the Senate, Mar. 10, 1995, ver-
sion 5). 
35. See 33 V.S.c.A. §§ 1285(j)(2)(D), 1311(b)(2)(A), 1314(b)(1)(B), 
1316(b)(1)(B) (West 2006). 
36. The rule on cooling water intake structures, for example, allows a conclusion 
that no new regulatory requirements are appropriate if a site-specific cost-benefit 
analysis shows that costs are significantly greater than benefits. See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 125.94(a)(5)(ii) (2006). 
37. Two narrow exceptions to this principle exist for situations in which pollution 
control improvements are physically impossible or would force widespread plant shut-
downs. See David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of EnVironmental, Health, and 
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agnostic on the question of whether regulation should proceed; 
technology-based regulation is not. 
A second major difference between cost-benefit analysis and 
technology-based regulation is that cost-benefit analysis requires 
quantification and monetization of the factors relevant to a deci-
sion, whereas technology-based regulation does not.38 Unlike cost-
benefit analysis, technology-based regulation does not depend on 
obtaining numbers for extremely specific aspects of a given regula-
tory program (such as exactly which fish species are killed by a 
particular cooling water intake structure, and in what numbers, and 
at what ages).39 Nor does it require the translation of such num-
bers into dollar figures. This step-"monetizing" regulatory bene-
fits-is at once the most controversial and most distinctive feature 
of cost-benefit analysis.40 
A third feature of cost-benefit analysis that distinguishes it from 
technology-based regulation is more obscure, but very important. 
Modern cost-benefit analysts insist upon "discounting" both the fu-
ture costs and future benefits of the regulation.41 This is a normal 
procedure for future financial costs. Discounting allows the analyst 
to determine, based on estimates of prevailing rates of return on 
financial investments, what money in the future will be worth com-
pared to money today. But cost-benefit analysts apply the same 
technique to non-monetary future goods (such as, in the cooling-
water context, fish and wildlife protected in the future through con-
trol technologies). The basic idea is that future events are not as 
important as present events.42 Thus, in the present setting, the fish 
of the future are worth appreciably less than today's fish. Technol-
ogy-based regulation includes nothing remotely resembling the 
technique of discounting. 
Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Re-
form, 32 s.c. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1, 9 (2005). 
38. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The Accidental Environmentalist: Judge Posner on 
Catastrophic Thinking, 94 GEO. L.J. 833, 836-37 (2006) (reviewing RICHARD A. Pos-
NER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004». 
39. See, e.g., National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-Proposed Regula-
tions to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Ex-
isting Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,122, 17,122-140 (proposed Apr. 9, 2002) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122-25). 
40. See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE 
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 61-90 (2004). 
41. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, at 33-34 (2003), avail-
able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf (requiring agencies con-
ducting cost-benefit analyses to discount future costs and benefits at seven and three 
percent per year respectively). 
42. Id. at 32. 
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In these ways-agnosticism about whether regulation occurs, 
and quantification, monetization, and discounting of costs and ben-
efits-cost-benefit analysis is very different from the technology-
based regulation of the Clean Water Act. 
C. OIRA, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Phase II Rulemaking 
OIRA has reviewed and directed the revision of numerous 
Clean Water Act rules in recent years. Here, I focus on EPA's rule 
on cooling water intake structures at existing power plants, known 
to aficionados as the "Phase II" rule because a rule on intake struc-
tures at new facilities (the "Phase I" rule) came first.43 For cooling 
purposes, power plants and other industrial facilities draw in stag-
gering amounts of water from adjacent water bodies.44 Equally 
staggering numbers of fish are killed when they are either trapped 
("impinged") at the inlet to these cooling water intake structures 
or drawn into the machinery of the structures themselves ("en-
trained").4s The Phase II rule is based on section 316(b) of the 
Clean Water Act, which aims to limit the large-scale fish kills that 
result from drawing huge amounts of cooling water into power 
plants.46 The rule has a long and complicated history. I highlight 
just two general points here. 
First, numerous important changes to EPA's initial proposal and 
to its proposed final rule were made during OIRA's review and at 
OIRA's behest. For example, when the rule first went to OIRA 
for review (before being formally proposed), it required the largest 
and most harmful plants to employ "closed-cycle recirculating cool-
ing," the most effective technology for avoiding the fish kills just 
described.47 OIRA ultimately removed this requirement during its 
review.48 OIRA also inserted a "compliance alternative," allowing 
43. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-Final Regulations To Es-
tablish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facili-
ties, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576 (July 9, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122-25). 
44. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 181 (2d Cir. 2004). 
45. [d. 
46. 33 V.S.c.A. § 1326(b) (West 2006). 
47. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EPA-HQ-OW-2002-0049, REVIEW DRAFf FOR 
THE PROPOSED SECTION 316(B) RULE FOR LARGE COOLING WATER INTAKE STRUC-
TURES AT EXISTING POWER GENERATING FACILITIES, DCN 4-4005, at 72 (Dec. 28, 
2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter OMB REVIEW DRAFT] (proposing to require 
closed-cycle cooling at fifty-nine plants). 
48. Compare id., with National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-Pro-
posed Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at 
Phase II Existing Facilities, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,122, 17,158 (proposed Apr. 9,2002) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 122-25) (rejecting requirement of closed-cycle cooling at 
these facilities based on comparison of monetized, incremental costs and benefits). 
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a facility to escape new regulatory requirements based on a site-
specific cost-benefit analysis showing that the costs of regulation 
were not worth the benefits.49 
Second, the cost-benefit analysis insisted upon by OIRA fea-
tured the characteristics of cost-benefit analysis described above-
agnosticism about whether any regulatory requirements will ulti-
mately be imposed, and quantification, monetization, and discount-
ing of the costs and benefits of regulation. 50 On agnosticism, the 
site-specific cost-benefit compliance alternative allows a facility to 
avoid regulation altogether if the costs of control technology are 
"significantly greater" than the benefitsY 
As for monetization, EPA struggled to attach a dollar figure to 
the benefits of this regulation. In the end, EPA could monetize 
only the benefits of saving the fish that, with the protections of this 
rule in place, will survive the hazards of cooling water intake struc-
tures, only later to be caught by commercial or recreational fish-
ers.52 EPA was unable to attach any separate dollar figure 
whatsoever to the benefits of 98.2 percent of the aquatic organisms 
saved by this rule.53 EPA could not identify the dollar value of the 
"nonuse" benefits provided by these organisms (such as ecological 
values).54 The final rule lists the benefits that EPA was unable to 
monetize. 55 
EPA used the discounting technique in two ways. First, EPA as-
sumed (without elaboration) that compliance costs would likely be 
incurred approximately one year before the relevant control tech-
49. Compare OMB REVIEW DRAFf, supra note 47, at 93-95 (declining to propose 
a compliance alternative based on site-specific cost-benefit analysis, due to adminis-
trative costs and regulatory uncertainties created by such an alternative), with OFFICE 
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EPA-HQ-OW-2002-0049, SECfION 316(B) PHASE II PRO-
POSED RULE SUMMARY OF MAJOR CHANGES DURING INTERAGENCY REVIEW, DCN 
4-4019 2 (May 23, 2002) (on file with author) (noting that this cost-benefit variance 
was added at OIRA's behest). 
50. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. 
51. See 40 c.F.R. § 125.94(a)(5)(ii) (2006) (site-specific cost-benefit determination 
"may conclude that design and construction technologies, operational measures, and/ 
or restoration measures in addition to those already in place are not justified because 
the costs would be significantly greater than the benefits" at a particular facility). 
52. See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-Final Regulations to 
Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Fa-
cilities, supra note 43, at 41,660-61. 
53. [d. at 41,661 ("The Agency's direct use valuation does not account for the 
benefits from the remaining 98.2 % of the age 1 equivalent aquatic organisms esti-
mated to be protected nationally under today's rule."). 
54. [d. 
55. See id. at 41,662. 
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no logy would be operational and thus begin saving fish.56 EPA dis-
counted the monetary value of the fish saved over this one year 
between the imposition of costs and the realization of benefits.57 
Second, EPA observed that the fish saved by the relevant control 
technologies would not have been caught by commercial or recrea-
tional fishers until they had reached some appropriate level of ma-
turity.58 EPA thought the benefits of the Phase II rule would not 
accrue until the date on which the fish saved by the rule would 
otherwise have been caught.59 For this reason, EPA discounted the 
fish-saving benefits of the rule for one or more years, depending on 
"the time of [the] ultimate harvest" of the relevant fish.60 Dis-
counting in this manner reduced the estimated benefits of saving 
fish through this rule by as much as thirty-four percent.61 
II. INTERPRETIVE ERRORS 
In its Phase II rulemaking, EPA erred by converting a technol-
ogy-based regulatory regime into a cost-benefit regime. Two im-
portant aspects of the final rule rest on EPA's unlawful 
interpretation of the statute: the rejection of a provision requiring 
closed-cycle cooling structures at the largest and most environmen-
tally damaging facilities,62 and the embrace of a "compliance alter-
native" based on site-specific cost-benefit analysis.63 EPA's 
substitution of a cost-benefit regime for a technology-based regime 
conflicts with the plain meaning of the Clean Water Act and thus is 
due no deference.64 Even if the Act were ambiguous on the rele-
vant issues, EPA's interpretation of the statute would not deserve 
deference.65 By caving in to the statutory interpretation foisted on 
it by OIRA,66 EPA earned the lesser measure of deference recog-
56. Id. at 41,658. 
57.Id. 
58.Id. 
59.Id. 
60.Id. 
61. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EPA-HQ-OW-2002-0049, MEMO TO PHASE II 
DOCKET, DISCOUNTING RECREATIONAL AND COMMERCIAL FISHING BENEFlTS, DCN 
5-2390 3 (Apr. 15, 2003) (on file with author). 
62. See supra note 47 and accompanying text; infra notes 68-71 and accompanying 
text. 
63. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; infra note 72 and accompanying 
text. 
64. See infra Part II.A. 
65. See infra Part II.B. 
66. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. 
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nized in recent Supreme Court cases that narrowed the instances in 
which Chevron's broad deference is available.67 
A. The Plain Meaning of Section 316(b) 
The cooling water tower case turns on the proper interpretation 
of section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act. As interpreted, section 
316(b) will determine the appropriateness of, among other things, 
EPA's performance standards for cooling water intake structures 
and its endorsement of a "compliance alternative" based on site-
specific cost-benefit analysis. EPA explicitly based its rejection of 
closed-cycle cooling at the largest and most harmful facilities, and 
its "compliance alternative" using site-specific cost-benefit analysis, 
on its view that section 316(b) authorizes cost-benefit balancing. 
EPA explained that it interpreted the phrase "best technology 
available" under section 316(b) to require "best technology availa-
ble commercially at an economically practicable COSt."68 EPA 
viewed economic practicability as including "a consideration of the 
relationship of costs to environmental benefits" and requiring 
"some reasonable relationship between the cost of cooling water 
intake structure control technology and the environmental benefits 
associated with its use."69 EPA then rejected closed-cycle cooling 
because it was "not determined to be the most cost-effective ap-
proach on a national basis."70 In reaching this conclusion, EPA did 
nothing more or less than a cost-benefit analysis.71 Similarly, EPA 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 238 (2001) (holding that 
judicial responses to administrative actions must continue to distinguish between 
those that are entitled to Chevron deference and those that are entitled to Skidmore 
deference). 
68. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-Final Regulations To Es-
tablish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facili-
ties, supra note 43, at 41,604. 
69.Id. 
70. Id. at 41,607. 
71. EPA does not explain why it concluded that closed-cycle cooling was not cost-
effective. (This lack of explanation is in itself a problem.) In its final draft for OMB 
review, in discussing cost-effectiveness, EPA simply stated that "[t]he incremental so-
cial costs of [closed-cycle cooling at the largest and most harmful facilities] relative to 
the proposed option ($686 million) significantly outweigh the incremental benefits 
($299 million)." See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EPA-HQ-OW-2002-0049, RE-
VIEW DRAFT OF PROPOSED SECTION 316(B) RULE FOR LARGE COOLING WATER IN-
TAKE STRUCTURES AT EXISTING POWER GENERATING FACILITIES 7-30 (Dec. 22, 
2003) (on file with author); see also National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys-
tem-Proposed Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake 
Structures at Phase II Existing Facilities, supra note 48, at 17,158 (offering same kind 
of analysis, but with figures of $413 million for incremental costs and $146 million for 
incremental benefits). EPA's analysis here is cost-benefit analysis; the agency simply 
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also based its cost-benefit "compliance alternative" on its view that 
section 316(b) authorizes cost-benefit balancing.72 Thus, the valid-
ity of both of these features of the rule depends on the validity of 
EPA's interpretation of the Act. 
The language of a statute is the starting point for statutory inter-
pretation.73 In the midst of the Clean Water Act's jumble of acro-
nyms, section 316(b) offers refreshingly plainspoken terms. Here is 
the provision in its entirety: 
Any standard established pursuant to section 1311 [301] of this 
title or section 1316 [306] of this title and applicable to a point 
source shall require that the location, design, construction, and 
capacity of cooling water intake structures reflect the best tech-
nology available for minimizing adverse environmental 
impact,74 
The key phrase of the provision is the one describing the re-
quired technology: "the best technology available for minimizing 
adverse environmental impact."75 Webster's Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary defines "minimize" as "to reduce to the smallest 
possible number, degree, or extent."76 The use of the term "mini-
mize" in environmental statutes has been strictly interpreted by the 
courts. For example, the D.C. Circuit construed the term "mini-
mized" in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act77 to re-
quire that EPA reduce the targeted harm to the greatest possible 
extent.78 Thus, section 316(b) charges EPA with reducing adverse 
environmental impacts from cooling water intake structures to the 
lowest possible degree. 
EPA's conversion of section 316(b) to a cost-benefit regime can-
not be squared with this unambiguous statutory language. A cost-
benefit regime does not minimize adverse environmental impacts; 
compares the results of two different cost-benefit analyses, for two different regula-
tory options. 
72. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-Final Regulations to Es-
tablish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facili-
ties, supra note 43, at 41,603 ("EPA decided to use a comparison of a facilities costs 
to the benefits of meeting the performance standards at the facility (a "cost-benefit 
test") as another basis for obtaining site-specific determination of BTA to minimize 
adverse environmental impact. "). 
73. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 V.S. 157, 166 (2004). 
74. 33 V.S.c.A. § 1326(b) (West 2006). 
75.Id. 
76. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1438 (1986). 
77. 42 V.S.c.A. § 6924(m)(1) (West 2006). 
78. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 361 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) ("To 'minimize' something is, to quote the Oxford English Dictionary, to 're-
duce [it] to the smallest possible amount, extent, or degree."'). 
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a cost-benefit regime balances costs against benefits in deciding 
what level of environmental impact is acceptable.79 A regime like 
section 316(b), which aims to minimize environmental impacts, ex-
plicitly favors environmental protection. Cost-benefit analysis 
does not do this. Indeed, given the difficulty of developing mean-
ingful numbers for the benefits of environmental protection,80 cost-
benefit analysis actually tips the scales against environmental pro-
tection. This is not the regime created by the language of minimi-
zation in section 316(b). 
Section 316(b)'s cross-reference to sections 301 and 306 of the 
Clean Water Act fortifies this conclusion. The Second Circuit has 
said that this cross-reference: 
is an invitation to look to section 306 for guidance in discerning 
what factors Congress intended the EPA to consider in deter-
mining the 'best technology available.' . . . Because section 
316(b) refers to sections 301 and 306 but provides a different 
standard ... we think it is permissible for the EPA to look to 
those sections for guidance but to decide that not every statu-
tory directive contained therein is applicable to the Rule.81 
As the court makes clear, section 316(b) describes a different 
standard-the minimization of adverse environmental effects-
than the standards contemplated by sections 301 and 306.82 In 
looking at sections 301 and 306 as guideposts to the meaning of 
"best technology available" under 316(b), the special standard 
enunciated in section 316(b) for cooling water intake structures 
must be preserved.83 
Sections 301 and 306 establish an array of technology-based stan-
dards. Among these are the "best available technology economi-
cally achievable,"84 the "best practicable control technology 
currently available,"85 the "best conventional pollutant control 
technology,"86 and the "best available demonstrated control tech-
nology."87 Linguistically, the technology-based standards cited in 
sections 301 and 306 that are closest to the "best technology availa-
ble" of section 316(b) are the standards for new sources under sec-
79. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. 
80. See, e.g., supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. 
81. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 186-87 (2d Cir. 2004). 
82. [d. at 187. 
83. [d. 
84. 33 U.S.c.A. § 1311(b)(2)(A) (West 2006). 
85. § 1311(b)(I)(A). 
86. § 1311(b)(2)(E). 
87. § 1316(a)(I). 
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tion 306 ("best available demonstrated control technology")88 and 
for existing sources under section 301(b )(2)(A) ("best available 
technology economically achievable").89 If Congress had wanted 
EPA to set standards for cooling water intake structures based on 
the "best practicable" control technology, or the "best conven-
tional" control technology, it could easily have done so. It did so in 
other provisions of the very same statute-provisions cited in sec-
tion 316(b) itself.9° Instead, in section 316(b), Congress used lan-
guage remarkably similar to that used to describe the technology-
based requirements under section 306 and 301(b )(2)(A). 
The importance of this point goes well beyond semantics, for the 
specific categorization of control technologies under the Clean 
Water Act ushers in a cascade of regulatory consequences. Most 
important for present purposes, the criteria for choosing the re-
quired technology change considerably from one technology-based 
standard to another. In particular, the consideration of costs in re-
lation to benefits is explicitly allowed in determining the "best prac-
ticable control technology"91 and the "best conventional pollutant 
control technology."92 The relationship between costs and benefits 
is not one of the factors listed as relevant in choosing the best avail-
able technology under sections 30693 or 301(b )(2)(A) of the Clean 
Water Act.94 Thus, neither of the provisions that bear the closest 
linguistic resemblance to section 316(b) authorize EPA to consider 
the relationship between costs and benefits in choosing the requi-
site technology. The explicit mention of cost-benefit comparisons 
in some provisions of the statute, and the lack of mention of that 
88. [d. 
89. § 1311(b)(2)(A). This standard applies to existing sources that involve pollu-
tants other than "conventional" pollutants. See id. (noting that section 1311 applies to 
pollutants identified in subsections (C), (D), and (F), which include toxic pollutants 
and pollutants that are not conventional pollutants). Cooling water intake structures 
involve neither toxic nor conventional pollutants. 
90. § 1311(b)(1)(A) ("best practicable"); § 1311(b)(2)(E) ("best conventional"). 
91. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (directing EPA to consider factors including "the total cost of 
application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved 
from such application"). 
92. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (directing EPA to consider factors including "the reasonable-
ness of the relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and the 
effluent reduction benefits derived"). Even here, and with respect to best practicable 
control technology, however, EPA has not relied upon the kind of formal, quantified, 
and monetized cost-benefit analysis that formed the basis of its decisions in this 
rulemaking proceeding. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 passim 
(D.C. Cir. 1978). 
93. § 1316(b)(1)(B) (referring only to costs, but not to benefits). 
94. § 1314(b)(2)(A). 
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comparison in other provisions, strongly indicates that Congress 
did not mean to allow that comparison under the provisions that do 
not mention it.95 
Thus, EPA may not, consistent with the unambiguous meaning 
of section 316(b), convert this provision into a cost-benefit regime. 
Congress could easily have charged EPA with considering the rela-
tionship between costs and benefits in setting standards under sec-
tion 316(b). Congress could have done this indirectly, by 
specifying that the standards should require use of the "best practi-
cable" or "best conventional" control technology (which would 
have brought with it consideration of the cost-benefit relationship), 
or directly, by using the same kind of language Congress used to 
describe the factors to be considered in setting certain technology-
based standards.96 
In creating a site-specific "compliance alternative" based on 
cost-benefit analysis, EPA also ignored explicit statutory language 
ruling out such an alternative. Congress painstakingly elaborated 
different rules for variances in different circumstances.97 In only 
one kind of case-involving "biochemical oxygen demand and pH 
from discharges ... into deep waters of the territorial seas"-was 
modification of technology-based requirements allowed based on a 
cost-benefit balancing.98 The other provisions for variances involve 
consideration of some combination of the kinds of factors the Sec-
ond Circuit upheld in reviewing the variance allowed for new 
sources under section 316(b): a comparison of actual costs to the 
costs predicted during the rulemaking proceeding, "significant ad-
verse impacts on local air quality," "significant adverse impacts on 
local water resources other than impingement and entrainment," 
and "significant adverse impacts on local energy markets."99 In al-
lowing a variance based on site-specific cost-benefit analysis for the 
existing sources covered by the Phase II rule, EPA went well be-
95. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 458 (2001) ("[T]he 
cost factor is both so indirectly related to public health and so full of potential for 
canceling the conclusions drawn from direct health effects that it would have been 
expressly mentioned ... had Congress meant it to be considered."). 
96. Again, the language describing the factors relevant to identifying "best practi-
cable" and "best conventional" control technology explicitly refers to the relationship 
between costs and benefits. See §§ 1314(b)(1)(B), 1314(b)(4)(B). 
97. EPA's decision to style the cost-benefit option a "compliance alternative" 
rather than a "variance" does not make the provisions of the Clean Water Act dealing 
with exceptions to technology-based standards-there styled "variances"-any less 
relevant. 
98. § 1311(m)(l)(B). 
99. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 192 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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yond the narrow variance it allowed for new sources in the Phase I 
proceeding. 100 
EPA's efforts to get around the clear meaning of section 316(b) 
are tinged with desperation. EPA notes the linguistic similarity be-
tween the "best technology available" of section 316(b) and the 
"best available demonstrated technology" of section 301.101 EPA 
states that it therefore looked to that section (and the closely re-
lated section 304) "for guidance in determining the best technology 
available" under section 316(b ).102 Nevertheless, EPA asserts: 
There are significant differences between section 316(b) and 
sections 301 and 304 .... In contrast to the effluent limitations 
provisions, the object of the 'best technology available' is explic-
itly articulated by reference to the receiving water: To minimize 
adverse environmental impact in the waters from which cooling 
water is withdrawn .... For this Phase II rulemaking, EPA there-
fore interprets CWA section 316(b) as authorizing EPA to con-
sider not only technologies but also their effects on and benefits 
to the water from which the cooling water is withdrawn.103 
This interpretation must underlie EPA's deployment of the 
"cost-effectiveness" test in rejecting closed-cycle cooling at the 
largest and most harmful facilities (since that test is but a refine-
ment of the cost-benefit balancing EPA describes in this passage). 
It also forms the express basis of EPA's embrace of a "compliance 
alternative" based on site-specific cost -benefit analysis. 104 
But the interpretation is absurd. First, if EPA had indeed looked 
for "guidance" in sections 301 and 304 when it was interpreting 
section 316(b), and done so responsibly, EPA would have found 
that cost-benefit balancing is foreclosed under section 316(b). Sec-
ond, to use the specific language of section 316(b) to enlarge EPA's 
authority to conduct cost-benefit balancing is bizarre. As discussed 
100. The cost-benefit "compliance alternative" in this rule also goes beyond the 
Phase I variance in other ways: the Phase I variance more clearly placed the entire 
burden of justifying a variance on the applicant; it required that the costs of a technol-
ogy at a specific site be "wholly disproportionate to"-rather than "significantly 
greater than"-the costs EPA had assumed in writing the rule; and it did not provide 
that it was acceptable not to do anything in response to the rule if the costs were high 
enough in relation to the benefits. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 125.85(a)(2)-(3) (2006) 
(Phase I variance provision), with 40 C.F.R. § 125.94(a)(5)(ii) (2006) (Phase II site-
specific "compliance alternative" based on cost-benefit analysis). 
101. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-Final Regulations To Es-
tablish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facili-
ties, supra note 43, at 41,582-83. 
102. [d. 
103. [d. 
104. [d. at 41,603-04. 
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above, several provisions of the Clean Water Act explicitly author-
ize the weighing of costs against benefits.105 As Weyerhaeuser 
makes clear, courts have not even interpreted these provisions as 
requiring the kind of formal cost-benefit analysis EPA required 
here.106 Thus, EPA must somehow argue that a provision requiring 
it to "minimize adverse environmental impacts" is less environ-
mentally protective (because it allows more relaxed regulatory 
standards under the rubric of formal cost-benefit analysis) than a 
provision that, like those in section 304, authorizes an informal 
comparison of economic costs and pollution reduction benefits. 
Although section 316(b) has an eye on the "effects on ... the water 
from which the cooling water is withdrawn,"107 EPA is directed to 
minimize those effects, not to balance them against economic 
costs. lOB EPA has read section 316(b) exactly backwards. 
In sum, EPA's transformation of section 316(b) into a cost-bene-
fit provision is inconsistent with the unambiguous meaning of that 
provision. As next discussed, even if section 316(b) were ambigu-
ous, the interpretation offered in EPA's rule-at the direction of 
OIRA-would not deserve deference under Chevron. 
B. Chevron and OIRA 
For reasons just discussed, one cannot argue that section 316(b) 
is unambiguous in the other direction; that is, that it unambigu-
ously allows cost-benefit analysis to serve as the criterion for 
choosing technologies under section 316(b), or that it unambigu-
ously permits a compliance alternative based on site-specific cost-
benefit analysis. Even EPA appears to have conceded this point. 
In the preamble to the final rule, the agency states that "neither the 
statute nor the legislative history requires a formal or informal 
cost-benefit assessment."109 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has refined its holding in 
Chevron by deciding that the degree of deference courts should 
give to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes depends on a 
105. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
106. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1046-47 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
107. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-Final Regulations To Es-
tablish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facili-
ties, surpa note 43, at 41,583. 
108. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
109. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System-Final Regulations To Es-
tablish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing Facili-
ties, supra note 43, at 41,604 (emphasis added). 
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wide array of factors yo The substantial deference afforded under 
Chevron11l to the agency charged with implementing a statute is, in 
other words, not automatically applicable whenever an agency of-
fers an interpretation of a statuteY2 Rather, the Court held in 
United States v. Mead Corporation, 
[t]he fair measure of deference to an agency administering its 
own statute has been understood to vary with circumstances, 
and courts· have looked to the degree of the agency's care, its 
consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the per-
suasiveness of the agency's position. The approach has pro-
duced a spectrum of judicial responses, from great respect at 
one end, to near indifference at the other.113 
The Court went on to quote Justice Jackson's opinion in Skid-
more v. Swift & CO.: 114 
The weight [accorded to an administrative jUdgment] in a partic-
ular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its con-
sideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which 
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.115 
The situation here calls for the application of Mead, not Chev-
ron. First and foremost, Chevron deference is due only to the 
agency responsible for implementing the statute in question, or, in 
Chevron's words, to the agency "entrusted to administer" the rele-
vant statuteY6 Moreover, as the Supreme Court held in Martin v. 
Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, when two dif-
ferent executive agencies clash, the agency with the greatest degree 
of implementing authority under the relevant statute deserves def-
erence to its interpretationY7 EPA is that agency in the case of the 
Clean Water Act. 118 
110. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001). 
111. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984). 
112. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 200-01 (2d Cir. 
2004). 
113. 533 U.S. at 228. 
114. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
115. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). 
116. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
117. 499 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1991); see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 914-22 
(2006) (declining to give Chevron deference to Attorney General's interpretation of 
the Controlled Substances Act, as Act did not delegate to the Attorney General the 
authority to make medical judgments). 
118. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(d) (West 2006) ("[T]he Administrator of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency ... shall administer this chapter."); § 1316(b)(1)(B) 
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The paper trail in the cooling water tower case makes clear that 
OIRA foisted on EPA an interpretation of the Clean Water Act 
that EPA itself had not developedp9 OIRA is not the agency 
charged with implementing the Clean Water Act. Indeed, the Act 
does not mention OIRA; it does not give OIRA even the tiniest 
role in implementing the ActPO In this way, therefore, the cooling 
water tower case is even more straightforward than Martin. In 
Martin, the agency that offered a statutory interpretation that con-
flicted with the interpretation of the agency given primary respon-
sibility for implementing the statute at least had some 
responsibilities under the statute.121 OIRA has no responsibilities 
under the Clean Water Act. EPA should not be given Chevron 
deference for an interpretation that simply bends to the will of a 
sister agency.122 
Another feature of the Phase II rulemaking also supports appli-
cation of the Mead rather than Chevron standard of review for 
EPA's interpretative choices. The interpretive choices I have refer-
enced here-such as the adoption of a "net benefits" standard and 
the embrace of a site-specific cost-benefit test-were made ab-
ruptly, in response to pressure from OIRA, rather than with care-
ful deliberation and application of EPA's unique expertise.123 The 
care with which an agency makes an interpretive choice is another 
factor in deciding how much deference to afford that choice.124 
Thus, not only OIRA's aggressive involvement in EPA's inter-
pretive choices, but also the agency's lack of care in making these 
choices, counsel in favor of withholding Chevron deference to 
EPA's interpretation in the rule on cooling water towers. 
("[T]he Administrator shall propose and publish regulations establishing Federal 
standards of performance for new sources .... "). 
119. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text; see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, EPA-HQ-OW-2002-0049, FORM FOR COMPLIANCE WITH E.O. 12866 
DOCKET REQUIREMENTS, DCN 6-5051 9 (Mar. 10,2005) (on file with author) (noting 
that OMB had advocated adding the "clarification that comparison of costs with ben-
efits is an important component of economic practicability"). 
120. Cf 42 V.S.c.A. § 7607(d)(4)(B)(ii) (West 2006) (Clean Air Act expressly re-
fers to OMB regulatory review process in requiring that drafts of proposed rules sub-
mitted for this process be placed in the relevant rule's public docket). 
121. 499 U.S. at 152-53. 
122. Cf Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 365-66 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989) (finding that EPA did not adequately explain the interpretation of the stat-
ute where it referred to representatives' post-enactment letter setting forth their own 
interpretation of the statute, as if their interpretation controlled EPA's view of the 
statute). 
123. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. 
124. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001). 
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Basic principles of administrative law support this conclusion. A 
bedrock principle of administrative law holds that an agency may 
not offer post hoc rationalizations for its regulatory choices.125 
This principle is, in fact, reflected in the decision of Mead itself. 
There, the Court strongly suggested that an agency may not sup-
port an interpretive choice through lawyers' arguments made after 
the interpretation has been settled.126 In the rule on cooling water 
towers, EPA's lawyers were essentially put in the position of appel-
late lawyers asked to defend an agency's pre-existing interpretive 
choice. EPA was given its marching orders by OIRA, and then 
EPA had to supply the legal rationale for the changes instigated by 
EPA.127 This is not the way agencies are supposed to go about in-
terpreting the statutes they administer.128 
Finally, the theoretical reasons for Chevron deference do not ap-
ply in a situation where an expert agency like EPA takes its inter-
pretive directions from OIRA. The Chevron Court itself justified 
deference to agency interpretations by noting that agencies' have 
greater expertise and political accountability than courtS.129 The 
same comparison is true for agencies like EPA and OIRA. 
OIRA's special expertise lies neither in science nor in control tech-
nologies-two basic underpinnings of EPA's regulatory decisions. 
In addition, when EPA makes a decision based on what OIRA has 
told it to do, political accountability is lacking; Administrator John-
son, not Administrator Graham (or his successor), will take the 
heat for what EPA ultimately does. Yet, responsibility properly 
lies with OIRA, not with EPA. 
The lack of accountability is made more pointed still by a pecu-
liar position EPA's lawyers have taken in the case involving cooling 
water intake structures. EPA's lawyers have argued to the Second 
Circuit that the documents showing what EPA did in response to 
125. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943). 
126. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (noting that the Court showed "near indifference" to an 
agency interpretation that appeared in a litigation brief in Bowen v. Georgetown 
Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988)); Mead, 533 U.S. at 238 n.19. 
127. See supra Part II.B. 
128. See, e.g., Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 627-28 (1971) (declining 
to defer to the Comptroller General's statutory interpretation where he "adopted no 
expressly articulated position at the administrative level as to the meaning and impact 
of the [relevant] provisions" and noting that although appellate counsel had offered 
such a position, "[ilt is the administrative official and not appellate counsel who pos-
sesses the expertise that can enlighten and rationalize the search for the meaning and 
intent of Congress"). 
129. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 
(1984). 
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OIRA's demands are not part of the administrative record and 
ought not be considered by the court in its review of EPA's deci-
sion.130 In essence, EPA's lawyers propose that the very docu-
ments that show why EPA did what it did in this rule are the very 
documents the court cannot consider in reviewing the rule. Such a 
position virtually guarantees confusion about who is accountable 
for the rule's results. 
CONCLUSION 
OIRA's increasingly aggressive role in controlling agency action 
is so far the biggest administrative law story of the new century. 
One part of the story is OIRA's role in shaping agencies' interpre-
tations of the laws they administer. In the case of the regulation of 
cooling water intake structures under the Clean Water Act, OIRA 
fundamentally changed the regulatory framework under which 
EPA was operating. OIRA's pointed involvement in this rulemak-
ing proceeding, and in others like it, eliminates any argument for 
interpretive deference under Chevron. 
130. Combined Reply in Support of EPA's Motion to Strike Portions of Briefs That 
Rely Upon Material Outside of the Administrative Record and in Opposition to Peti-
tioners' Cross-Motions to Supplement the Record at 10-17, Surfrider Found. v. EPA, 
No. 04-6692 (2d Cir. January 20, 2006) (on file with the author). 
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